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News+Media Cap. Grp. LLC v. Las Vegas Sun, Inc., 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 45 (Sep. 16, 2021)1
ARBITRATION AWARDS: DEFINING THE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR PRIVATE
ARBITRATION RESULTS
SUMMARY
The Nevada Supreme Court considered whether an arbitrator’s award in a commercial
contract dispute was so egregiously wrong that the Court could overturn the results. A mere error
of law or fact is an insufficient basis to overturn an arbitration award, but courts may overturn an
award if the arbitrator either exceeds the scope of his or her powers pursuant to NRS
38.241(1)(d), renders an award that is arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by the parties’
agreement, or manifestly disregards the law.
In this matter, the Court reaffirmed the district court’s finding that the arbitrator’s award
was appropriate because (1) the arbitrator’s interpretation of the contract was minimally
plausible, (2) evidence in the record supports the award, and (3) the arbitrator did not knowingly
disregard clearly controlling law or reach a result contrary to his own understanding of the law
and the parties’ agreement.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1989, the Las Vegas Sun (“the Sun”) entered into a joint operating agreement (“JOA”)
with the Las Vegas Review Journal (“the RJ”) to maintain its financial stability. Under this
agreement, both the Sun and the RJ retained their separate news operations, but the RJ was
responsible for production, distribution, and advertising and collected all revenue. The RJ paid
the Sun a percentage of total operating profits each month after deducting joint “Agency
Expenses” which included news and editorial expenses.
The parties entered into an amended agreement in 2005. Though this new agreement was
like the 1989 JOA, the agreement did not refer to “Agency Expenses.” By eliminating this
reference, the new agreement altered the RJ’s payment structure to the Sun because the RJ could
no longer deduct news and editorial expenses from the total operating profits.
Though the 2005 agreement ceased to allow for deductible editorial expenses, the
agreement instructed that the total operating profits be calculated in a manner consistent with the
‘Retention’ calculation as it appears in the 2004 Stephens Media Group profit-and-loss
statement. In this profit-and-loss statement, the ‘Retention’ computation deducted editorial costs,
thus creating a conflict between the language of the agreement and the calculation instructions.
The 2005 agreement also contained a mandatory arbitration clause which covered payment
disputes.
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The RJ continued to deduct editorial expenses from the total operating profits prior to
paying the Sun its monthly percentage, and in 2018 the Sun sued the RJ for breach of contract.
During arbitration, the Sun argued that because “Agency Expenses” were eliminated in the 2005
agreement, it was improper for the RJ to deduct editorial expenses from the total operating
profits. In response, the RJ contended it was proper to deduct editorial expenses pursuant to the
‘Retention’ calculation in the profit-and-loss statement. The arbitrator ultimately found that
editorial expenses were not deductible, and that the Sun had proven damages. The arbitrator
declined to award either side their requested attorney fees.
The Sun moved the district court to confirm the substantive award but to vacate denial of
attorney fees, and the RJ cross-moved the district court to vacate the arbitrator’s entire decision.
The district court denied both motions, confirmed the award, and reasoned that there was no
clear and convincing evidence to support the contention that the arbitrator either exceeded his
powers, rendered an award that was arbitrary and capricious, or manifestly disregarded the law in
making his decision.
DISCUSSION
Nevada adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act of 2000 which is consistent with the state’s
policy of promoting the efficient enforcement of agreements.2 When compared with litigation,
arbitration is faster, allows parties to enjoy use of an arbitrator with specialized knowledge and
competence, and is entitled to more privacy.3 To opt for mandatory binding arbitration is a
contractual choice, and courts respect this choice by heavily erring on the side of arbitration
when disputes arise over the results.4 Not only do courts want to preserve the efficiency and
other benefits of arbitration, but the party that seeks to overturn an arbitration award must also
overcome the high burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that the arbitrator made
more than a mere mistake in rendering the award.5
Both the RJ and the Sun argue that (1) the arbitrator exceeded his powers pursuant to
NRS 38.241(1)(d), (2) the award was arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by the agreement,
and (3) the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law.
The arbitrator did not exceed his powers
NRS 38.241(1)(d) dictates that arbitrators exceed their powers when they make decisions
or results based on information or issues outside the scope of the parties’ agreement.6 Arbitrators
do not exceed their powers so long as their interpretation of the agreement is rational; it is
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irrelevant whether that interpretation is erroneous.7 As such, the issue on review becomes
whether the arbitrator had the authority to decide an issue at all and not whether the arbitrator
correctly decided the issue.8 Though arbitrators may not expressly contradict the plain language
of the agreement, they may interpret this language however they choose so long as the
interpretation and subsequent award are “colorable.”9
The Court reviewed the 2005 agreement and determined that the arbitrator’s award did
not directly contradict the express language of the contract and was “colorable” because there
was a minimally plausible argument to support the arbitrator’s decision. In deciding that editorial
expenses were non-deductible, the arbitrator merely weighed the presented evidence and decided
an arguable question, which was within his scope of authority under the arbitration clause.
Additionally, the arbitrator did not exceed his authority by choosing not to award either party
attorney fees. Although the agreement included “fees and costs of arbitration,” the arbitrator’s
interpretation that this did not include attorney fees was a plausible construction, and this is all
that is required to support that the arbitrator acted within his scope of authority in making the
decision.
The arbitrator’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious
The common law permits vacatur of an arbitration award if the award is arbitrary and
capricious or unsupported by the parties’ agreement.10 An arbitrator’s findings are arbitrary and
capricious if they are not substantially supported by evidence in the record, and this standard
ensures that the arbitrator is not wholly disregarding the terms of the agreement.11 Because the
“unsupported by the agreement” factor employs functionally the same analysis as NRS
38.241(1)(d)’s “exceeding the scope” factor, the Court determined that because the arbitrator did
not exceed the scope of his authority, his award was also supported by the parties’ agreement.
Therefore, the Court focused its attention solely on whether the award was based on findings not
substantially supported by evidence in the record.
In this case, the facts were not in dispute, and the arbitrator based his determinations
solely on his legal interpretation of the Sun and the RJ’s 2005 agreement. As such, the
arbitrator’s interpretation cannot be arbitrary and capricious because the standard does not apply
to invalidate an arbitrator’s legal conclusions.12 The Sun argues that the arbitrator’s choice to
exclude certain expenses from the award other than attorney fees constitutes a factual dispute.
However, because this assertion is unsupported by any record citation, it categorically fails to
clear the “clear and convincing” hurdle needed to prove that the arbitrator’s choice to exclude
those costs was arbitrary and capricious.
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The arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law
A reviewing court may vacate an arbitration award if the arbitrator consciously and
manifestly disregarded the applicable law.13 Courts treat “manifest disregard” as akin to
intentional misconduct in that it is not enough for an arbitrator to reach a legally incorrect result;
rather, the arbitrator must reach that incorrect result deliberately.14 The RJ argued that in
Coblentz v. Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees Union Welfare Fund, the Court required
less than a showing of conscious and deliberate error prior to vacating an arbitration award, and
that a manifest disregard for the law requires only that the award render language in the
agreement without effect.15 In response, the Court partially overruled Coblentz to require a
“knowing” element to prove manifest disregard.
In holding that the arbitrator here did not manifestly disregard the law, the Court
reasoned that all but one of both parties’ arguments can be reduced to assertions that the
arbitrator incorrectly applied the law and do not allege the requisite subjective intent necessary to
show manifest disregard. The one potentially viable argument is the RJ’s contention that the
arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law by issuing an award that disallowed deducting editorial
costs after acknowledging that editorial costs were allowable deductions under the profit-andloss statement. Yet, the Court concluded that the record does not support this assertion because
there were multiple ways to interpret the 2005 agreement. Nothing in the arbitrator’s award
suggests that the arbitrator knowingly issued the award in contrast to his own understanding of
the applicable law or his interpretation of the agreement.
CONCLUSION
To preserve the integrity and benefits of the arbitration process, it is paramount that any
judicial review be abbreviated and that courts give due deference to the results of arbitration by
overturning awards only in extremely limited circumstances.
Errors of law or fact—even serious errors—are insufficient to overturn an award. Rather,
parties seeking to overturn must show by clear and convincing evidence that the arbitrator either
(1) exceeded the scope of his or her authority by issuing an award that lacks even minimal
plausibility, (2) based the award on a factual finding that is arbitrary and capricious because it is
not supported by substantial evidence in the record, or (3) knowingly disregarded the controlling
law prior to issuing the award.
Here, the Court found the district court’s affirmation of the arbitrator’s award appropriate
because (1) the arbitrator’s interpretation of the contract was minimally plausible, (2) evidence in
the record supports the award, and (3) the arbitrator did not knowingly disregard clearly
controlling law or reach a result contrary to his own understanding of the law and the parties’
agreement.
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White, 133 Nev. at 306, 396 P.3d at 839.
Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1459–62 (11th Cir. 1997).
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